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Economic Preferences and Attitudes of the Unemployed: 
Are Natives and Second Generation Migrants Alike?
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In this paper we study the economic effects of risk attitudes, time preferences, trust and 
reciprocity while we compare natives and second generation migrants. We analyze an inflow 
sample into unemployment in Germany, and find differences between the two groups mainly 
in terms of risk attitudes and positive reciprocity. Second generation migrants have a 
significantly higher willingness to take risks and they are less likely to have a low amount of 
positive reciprocity when compared to natives. We also find that these differences matter in 
terms of economic outcomes, and more specifically in terms of the employment probability 
about two months after unemployment entry. We observe a significantly lower employment 
probability for individuals with a high willingness to take risks. Some evidence suggests that 
this result is channeled through reservation wages and search intensity. 
 
 
JEL Classification:  F22, J15, J61, J64 
  






Klaus F. Zimmermann 
IZA 
P.O. Box 7240 
D-53072 Bonn 
E-mail: zimmermann@iza.org  
 
                                                 
* Financial support from the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, DFG) 
for the project on “Ethnic Diversity and Labor Market Success” in the DFG-Priority Program “Flexibility 
in Heterogeneous Labor Markets” (Flexibilisierungspotenziale bei heterogenen Arbeitsmärkten) is 
gratefully acknowledged. The IAB (Nuremberg) kindly gave us permission to use the administrative 
data employed in this study in the context of the IZA Evaluation Dataset (Caliendo et al., 2010). We 
would like to thank Marco Caliendo, Corrado Giulietti, Bas ter Weel and two anonymous referees for 
helpful comments and Daniela Geppert for excellent research assistance. All remaining errors are our 
own. 1 Introduction
The intensity of the long-standing discussion about migrants’ integration into soci-
ety, and in particular into the labor market, has noticeably increased. Based on the
observation that migrants experience higher unemployment rates, lower employ-
ment rates and lower earnings when compared to natives in many countries (see
e.g. Kahanec and Zaiceva, 2009), the debate centers around the question how those
native-migrant gaps in economic outcomes can be explained and reduced.
The group of second generation migrants becomes more and more of a con-
cern. Over the course of the past century, many countries have accumulated sizeable
stocks of migrants and their descendants. Although one would expect differences
in economic outcomes between migrants and natives to decrease from one migrant
generation to the next, this is generally not the case (see Algan et al., 2010, for ev-
idence on France, Germany and the UK). The persistence of native-migrant gaps in
economic outcomes is puzzling—in spite of the potential explanations discussed in
the literature1—and it is a serious concern. Successfully addressing this issue repre-
sents one of the major challenges many economies are currently facing. Germany,
for instance, will sooner rather than later be faced with the consequences of demo-
graphic change. Shortages of skilled workers are already reported by an increasing
number of industries. Therefore, qualifying and integrating migrants in general and
the second generation migrants in particular becomes even more important.
In this paper we focus on entrants into unemployment in Germany and compare
natives and second generation migrants in terms of their labor market reintegration.
We follow this approach for two main reasons. The ﬁrst reason is that, over time,
employment biographies have become more unstable and more fragmented, while
the German labor market has become more ﬂexible (Eichhorst et al., 2010). Job
search, whether successful or not, is of critical importance. Short periods of unem-
ployment incurred while transitioning from one job to the next are nowadays more
the rule than the exception. Research on unemployment duration and frictions in
the labor market has become even more pertinent in light of the recent economic
crisis. Second, Germany represents a prime example of a country with a sizeable
stock of second generation migrants and persistent gaps in economic outcomes be-
tween natives and second generation migrants. In 2007, almost 19 percent of the
German population (or 15.4 million individuals) had a migration background (R¨ uhl,
2009). Among them, about one third were born in Germany, and are thus second
generation migrants. Today’s second generation migrants are mostly the offspring
1Potential explanations are e.g. based on ethnic or institutional discrimination (Kaas and Manger,
2010; Kogan, 2007), on differences in ethnic or human capital (Kalter and Granato, 2007), and on
concepts of ethnic identity (Heath et al., 2008; Blackaby et al., 2005; Constant and Zimmermann,
2009).
1of the so-called guest workers.2 In light of its post-war economic boom, Germany’s
migration policy had focused on the recruitment of low-skilled foreign labor, mainly
from Southern Europe, the guest workers. By 1973, however, and with the economic
crisis, the inﬂux of guest workers from Southern Europe had ceased. The persistent
and substantial gaps between natives and the ﬁrst or the second generation migrants
in Germany are manifested in a number of economic outcomes, such as unemploy-
ment rates. Since the early 1970s, the unemployment rates of natives and migrants
have been drifting apart. In 2008, the average unemployment rate of migrants was
more than twice as high as that of natives (18.1 percent vs. 8.0 percent, Statistik der
Bundesagentur f¨ ur Arbeit, 2009). This is partially due to differences in job search
behavior. For instance, Uhlendorff and Zimmermann (2006) show that unemployed
migrants ﬁnd less stable positions than natives with the same observable and unob-
servable characteristics. Moreover, migrants need more time to ﬁnd jobs. Constant
et al. (2009) also analyze the labor market reintegration of migrants in Germany in
comparison to natives. They ﬁnd that “separated” migrants need more time to ﬁnd
employment.3 This ﬁnding seems to be related to the migrants’ exerted search effort
and to their reservation wage levels.
We analyze the economic preferences and attitudes of unemployed second gen-
eration migrants in Germany, and we compare them with unemployed native Ger-
mans with regard to risk attitudes, time preferences, trust and reciprocity. These are
traits that lately have garnered the attention of economists. The recent economic
literature highlights the importance of “non-cognitive” skills (see Heckman and Ru-
binstein, 2001, for an early contribution on this topic and Borghans et al., 2008, for
a recent overview). More importantly, non-cognitive skills can inﬂuence economic
outcomes above and beyond factors such as human capital or household composi-
tion. However, while the latter determinants are frequently analyzed and relatively
robust ﬁndings have been established, research on preferences and attitudes—and
more generally on personality traits—and their inﬂuence on economic outcomes has
started only recently. Further research is needed in this area: for instance, if there
are non-cognitive differences between natives and second generation migrants who
become unemployed, one can (and should) take such differences into account—e.g.
when designing active and passive labor market policies. A better understanding
of these factors can certainly help improve the labor market integration of second
generation migrants. Recent contributions that explore the link between person-
ality traits, unemployment and job search include e.g. Caliendo et al. (2010) and
McGee (2010), who investigate the inﬂuence of locus of control, as well as Uysal
and Pohlmeier (2010), who analyze the role of the “Big Five” taxonomy to classify
personality traits.
2Other large groups of migrants in Germany are ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe, recent
immigrants from the EU and accession countries, and humanitarian migrants.
3Separated migrants have a strong ethnic identity of the home country and a weak ethnic attach-
ment to the host country.
2Our research question is whether and how unemployed second generation mi-
grants differ from unemployed natives in terms of economic preferences and at-
titudes. If such differences exist, they may explain at least part of the persistent
native-migrant gap in economic outcomes. We base our analysis on rich survey data
of an inﬂow sample into unemployment from the IZA Evaluation Dataset (Caliendo
et al., 2010). We show that there are indeed differences between the two groups
with respect to these characteristics. Moreover, non-cognitive differences appear to
matter in terms of job search and labor market reintegration. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst
ﬁnd that unemployed second generation migrants have a signiﬁcantly higher will-
ingness to take risks and that they are less likely to have a low amount of positive
reciprocity when compared to natives. Second, we also ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly lower
employment probability two months after unemployment entry for individuals with
a high willingness to take risks. However, the signiﬁcantly lower employment prob-
ability of second generation migrants remains rather stable across speciﬁcations.
Our contribution to the literature is that we provide novel and direct evidence
on the relationship between economic preferences, attitudes and labor market rein-
tegration of natives and second generation migrants. In this paper we only consider
early exits from unemployment. These exits are very important because they prevent
individuals from becoming long-term unemployed. It is widely accepted that longer
spells of unemployment invoke a number of undesired consequences such as depre-
ciation of skills, qualiﬁcations and capabilities (see e.g. Edin and Gustavsson, 2008),
and a number of dire ramiﬁcations such as a thin labor market with fewer available
jobs which, in turn, perpetuates a downward spiral of continuing unemployment
(Pissarides, 1992), as well as stigmatization and unhappiness.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature on the rela-
tionship between preferences, attitudes and economic outcomes. After a description
of our data and the sample in Section 3, empirical evidence on economic preferences
and attitudes of unemployed second generation migrants in comparison to natives
is presented in Section 4. Section 5 analyzes the relationship between non-cognitive
characteristics and labor market reintegration. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Preferences, Attitudes and Economic Outcomes
In this paper we compare unemployed natives and unemployed second generation
migrants with respect to four non-cognitive traits, namely a) risk attitudes, b) time
preferences, c) trust and d) reciprocity. We thus study the role of these four traits
in determining economic outcomes in the labor market, especially in the job search
process. We also discuss potential differences in the distribution of these character-
istics between natives and migrants (and second generation migrants, if applicable)
and brieﬂy review the existing empirical evidence.
In this section, we concentrate on supply side effects in the job search process.
3This does not imply that we rule out any demand side effects that could very well
be simultaneously present. For instance, if employers prefer employees with certain
inclinations and attitudes, this would affect the job offer arrival rate or the wage
offer distribution. The presence of such effects would, further, also be reﬂected in
the job seekers’ search intensity and reservation wages.
2.1 Risk Attitudes
Almost every economic decision involves risk. Acting in an environment of uncer-
tainty, the willingness to take risks inﬂuences the decisions which are taken as well
as the resulting economic outcomes. Examples include investment decisions (stocks,
home ownership) or decisions about educational attainment.
Job search is also a risky activity. In the standard model of job search (McCall,
1970; Mortensen, 1970), a job seeker decides at a given point in time about whether
to accept a job offer. He or she thus faces a trade-off between the current wage that
is offered and the expected future gains of continued search. While this decision
is made under uncertainty, the standard model assumes risk neutral individuals. If
this assumption is relaxed (see e.g. Pissarides, 1974), it can be shown that more
risk averse individuals will terminate the job search at an earlier stage because they
are less selective and will thus spend less time in unemployment—at the cost of a
lower expected wage conditional on employment. The more risk averse a given job
seeker is, the less value he or she attaches to expected, yet uncertain, future gains
of search. Consequently, a higher risk aversion leads to a lower reservation wage.
Empirical evidence on the latter relationship can be found in Pannenberg (2010),
who shows that risk aversion and reservation wages are negatively correlated.
Migration is a risky activity, too. The prior is that individuals who are relatively
more willing to take risks are more likely to migrate. A recent study on intra-German
mobility (Jaeger et al., 2010) seems to concur. However, there is no clear-cut the-
oretical predictions with respect to risk attitudes of international migrants. On the
one hand, standard migration models predict a lower risk aversion for migrants com-
pared to the native population (Heitmueller, 2005). On the other hand, in as far as
risk aversion is correlated with cognitive ability,4 self-selection models of migration
(Borjas, 1987; Chiswick, 1978) predict a differentiated distribution of risk aversion
among migrants: high-skilled migrants are more willing to take risks, while low-
skilled migrants are more risk averse than natives. Depending on the distribution
of the cognitive abilities of migrants and of their risk attitudes in both the host and
home country, the average migrant may be more or less willing to take risks. Finally,
the distribution of risk attitudes in the host and home country may be fundamentally
different, e.g. because of cultural differences.
4Dohmen et al. (2010) ﬁnd that risk aversion systematically varies with cognitive ability. Individ-
uals with higher cognitive ability are signiﬁcantly more willing to take risks.
4It is therefore an empirical question whether, and to what extent, the risk atti-
tudes of migrants and natives differ. Bonin et al. (2009) use a representative sample
of the population in Germany and show that ﬁrst generation migrants are more risk
averse than native Germans. The authors provide a few possible explanations of
this ﬁnding. First, the migration decision of guest workers involved a rather low
amount of risk, since they were given a job immediately upon arrival in Germany.
Second, migrants with a higher willingness to take risks might have already returned
to their country of origin, or may have migrated to other countries. Third, migrants
in Germany might in general be rather low-skilled and thus relatively more risk
averse than the average migrant in other destination countries. However, Bonin
et al. (2009) also ﬁnd that the difference between natives and migrants disappears
in the second generation migrants. In another study, Bonin et al. (2006) ﬁnd that
when German migrants adapt to the attitudes, culture and behavior of native Ger-
mans the immigrant-native gap in risk proclivity closes, but when migrants remain
committed to their home country’s culture the gap is preserved. As risk attitudes are
behaviorally relevant, and vary by ethnic origin, these results could explain differ-
ences in the economic assimilation of immigrants.
2.2 Time Preferences
Economic decisions are frequently characterized by immediate costs and delayed
beneﬁts. An example is saving for retirement. Whenever such a scenario arises, time
preferences are relevant. The degree to which people discount the future obviously
matters. In this context, a growing literature has challenged the conventional view;
hyperbolic discounting turns out to be an important empirical phenomenon. In this
framework, agents are allowed to discount time-inconsistently (see e.g. Laibson,
1997). Such behavior also seems to matter for fertility decisions (Wrede, 2010).
Time preferences are a critical factor in the job search process. Searching for a
job is an unpleasant activity, where costs arise immediately, and beneﬁts materialize
only in the future. However, the effect of impatience on exit rates from unemploy-
ment is theoretically unclear: more impatient job seekers search less intensively, but
they also set lower reservation wages (DellaVigna and Paserman, 2005). It is thus
an empirical question which of the two opposing effects dominates. DellaVigna and
Paserman (2005) and Paserman (2008) both support the model of hyperbolic time
preferences. Hyperbolic job seekers are particularly sensitive to the direct cost of
searching and devote (too) little search effort. The latter study, however, detects
heterogeneity in this regard for US job seekers; whereas the degree of hyperbolic
discounting for low and medium wage workers is substantial, high wage workers
exhibit only a moderate degree of short-run impatience.
The decision to migrate also entails short-run costs and long-run beneﬁts, and
therefore time preferences matter in this regard. The typical expectation is that
more patient individuals are more likely to migrate, other things equal—at least
5from the source country’s perspective. From the destination country’s perspective,
similar arguments hold as in the case of migration and risk attitudes. For instance,
if time preferences are correlated with cognitive abilities,5 self-selection models of
migration predict a differentiated distribution of time preferences among migrants.
Moreover, the distribution of time preferences could potentially be very different in
the source and destination country.
Gibson and McKenzie (2009) examine the source country’s perspective, and
more precisely three Paciﬁc countries (Tonga, Papua New Guinea and New Zealand).
They show that a high-skilled individual’s decision to migrate is strongly associated
with the degree of patience. More patient individuals are signiﬁcantly more likely to
migrate.6
2.3 Trust
Interactions among humans usually involve, and are based on, trust. From an indi-
vidual’s perspective, trust captures something fundamental about the way that other
people are approached. Interactions often involve vulnerability to betrayal. Trust is
an important factor whether an individual enters those situations at all, and how he
or she behaves in them (Dohmen et al., 2006). More speciﬁcally, economic transac-
tions are typically characterized by incomplete contracts, and thus trust plays a key
role in this context.
The literature generally agrees that informal job search channels are popular and
also effective methods (Granovetter, 1973, 1974; Holzer, 1988; Blau and Robins,
1990; Montgomery, 1991). Such methods have the advantage of being relatively
less costly and can provide comparatively reliable information about jobs. During
job search, both the access to informal channels as well as the actual use of these
channels are central to future employment success. Informal search involves to some
extent an implicit and incomplete contract, and it draws on the individuals’ network
or social capital. Deﬁning social capital as the “density of trust existing within a
group” (Paldam and Svendsen, 2000), trusting behavior positively inﬂuences the
size as well as the quality of a person’s social network.7 Finally, informal search
also relies on trust between the involved parties. The job seeker has to trust his
or her social contact—otherwise, he or she would not ask this friend or relative for
assistance in the ﬁrst place.
Although typically it is the individual who migrates from one country to another,
recent migration research takes into account the importance of the family and house-
5Dohmen et al. (2010) ﬁnd that time preferences are systematically correlated with cognitive
ability. Individuals with higher cognitive ability are signiﬁcantly more patient in their experiment.
6Gibson and McKenzie (2009) measure patience with a binary variable. It indicates whether
individuals prefer $1,100 in one year compared to $1,000 today.
7See e.g. Caliendo et al. (2010) for empirical evidence on the relationship between network size
and the use of job search methods.
6hold as the relevant decision-making unit (see e.g. Massey et al., 2005; Rabe, 2010).
The family often supports the migrant around the time of his or her migration. In
return, the migrant sends remittances back home to them. This implicit contract
involves an informal system of exchange, and it is obviously based to a large extent
on trust. Therefore—at least in such circumstances—trust can be an important de-
terminant of migration. However, the question whether natives or migrants exhibit
a higher degree of trust is uncertain. Most likely, the distribution of trust in the
host country and in the country of origin are very different. In fact, Butler et al.
(2009) document systematic differences in the distribution of trust across 26 Euro-
pean countries.
Empirical evidence on potential differences between natives and migrants in the
degree of trust is scarce. An exception is Hooghe et al. (2009), who ﬁnd in a sample
of 20 European countries that individuals who were born abroad are signiﬁcantly
less trustful than individuals who were born in the respective country of residence.
Dinesen and Hooghe (2010) ﬁnd that second generation migrants exhibit similar
levels of trust to natives than the ﬁrst generation do. A process of adaptation or
assimilation thus seems to take place over the migrant generations.
2.4 Reciprocity
Many people deviate from purely self-interested behavior in a reciprocal manner
(Fehr and G¨ achter, 2000). This has two implications: a) individuals may react in
response to nice behavior much nicer than standard models would predict (positive
reciprocity), and b) their response to unkind actions may be retaliation or punish-
ment (negative reciprocity). This, of course, also matters for economic outcomes.
Examples include the provision of public goods or, more generally, how social norms
are established and maintained.
Reciprocity also inﬂuences labor market outcomes. Dohmen et al. (2009) ﬁnd,
among other things, that positively reciprocal individuals are signiﬁcantly less likely
to be unemployed. In contrast, negatively reciprocal individuals are signiﬁcantly
more likely to be unemployed. Those ﬁndings can be explained as follows: whereas
positive reciprocity may help to establish successful long-term employment relation-
ships, negative reciprocity may lead to an early termination of such relationships.
When comparing natives’ and migrants’ degree of reciprocity, there are no clear
theoretical predictions and empirical evidence is scant. Cox and Orman (2010),
however, provide experimental evidence. The authors highlight the interaction of
trust and reciprocity in their study. They show that people are in general reciprocal,
and that this may lead to a self-fulﬁlling prophecy for migrants. As migrants are
trusted less than natives (even by other migrants), they react with (negative) recip-
rocal behavior in response. Therefore, they indeed appear to be less trustworthy.
The lack of trust may thus hinder migrants’ assimilation or integration with the host
country’s society.
73 Data
We use data from the IZA Evaluation Dataset (Caliendo et al., 2010) and concentrate
on one of its two pillars. Namely, a survey of almost 18,000 individuals who entered
unemployment between June 2007 and May 2008. Our analysis is based on the ﬁrst
wave of the survey, which took place about two months after unemployment entry.8
This has the advantage that individual characteristics, attitudes and preferences are
unlikely to have changed in response to unemployment entry. Another advantage
of our data is the speciﬁc focus on entrants into unemployment. The IZA Evaluation
Dataset is thus very appropriate for studying the processes of job search and labor
market reintegration. Similar household surveys are generally designed to be rep-
resentative of the whole population (e.g. the German Socio-Economic Panel Study,
GSOEP), which has an important drawback when studying unemployed individuals
because sample sizes decrease substantially.
Our data address a large variety of topics. The questions cover many impor-
tant individual characteristics, which are rarely available for economic research but
have been shown to inﬂuence economic outcomes nonetheless. Among these char-
acteristics are the four economic preferences and attitudes that this paper focuses
on. These characteristics have been elicited for individuals who were born in Ger-
many, in order to keep sample attrition tractable.9 This explains why we compare
the second generation migrants with natives and not the ﬁrst generation migrants.
Moreover, the questions for these characteristics were only included for individuals
who entered unemployment in June 2007, October 2007 and February 2008. This
reduces the size of our initial sample to fewer than 4,000 individuals.
For our analysis, we select individuals who are between 18 and 55 years old
at the time they enter unemployment. We exclude individuals with missing infor-
mation on important characteristics. After applying these criteria, our ﬁnal sample
consists of 2,875 individuals. Among those there are 2,609 natives and 266 second
generation migrants. We deﬁne second generation migrants to include a) individ-
uals who are German-born but do not have German citizenship, and b) individuals
who are German-born but at least one of their parents is not German-born. Com-
pared to the entire German population, second generation migrants are thus slightly
over-represented in our sample of entrants into unemployment.10
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics of our sample of entrants into unemploy-
ment, separately for natives and second generation migrants. Second generation
8The survey consists of two additional rounds of interviews. Respondents are interviewed again
one year and three years after unemployment entry, respectively.
9The entry cohorts into unemployment which are analyzed in our paper have been surveyed in an
(additional) intermediate wave of interviews (Caliendo et al., 2010). Sample attrition is therefore of
particular concern for this group.
10The share of second generation migrants in the German population is about 7 percent (R¨ uhl,
2009), whereas this share amounts to about 9 percent in our sample.
8migrants are signiﬁcantly younger than natives—on average about three years. The
gender distribution is similar: in both groups, slightly less than half of the sample are
females. Obviously, every native in our sample has German citizenship, but this is
also the case for the majority of second generation migrants. Only about one in four
individuals in this group has citizenship other than German. This can be explained
by the fact that our sample, by construction, only includes individuals who were born
in Germany.11 The share of natives living in East Germany is signiﬁcantly larger than
the fraction of second generation migrants in this part of Germany. A more de-
tailed assessment of the individuals’ migration background reveals that the majority
of second generation migrants in West Germany has a migration background. While
the migration background of the West German migrants can be traced back to the
so-called guest worker countries, the origins of the second generation migrants in
East Germany are mainly in Central and Eastern European countries.12 The share of
married individuals is similar for both natives and second generation migrants.
With respect to the educational and vocational attainment of natives and sec-
ond generation migrants, two differences stand out. First, the fraction of second
generation migrants with a degree from a 9-year secondary school (Hauptschule) is
signiﬁcantly larger than the fraction of natives. In contrast, a signiﬁcantly larger
proportion of natives have a 10-year secondary school degree (Realschule) than the
second generation migrants. Second, the share of second generation migrants with-
out a formal vocational degree is substantial and signiﬁcantly larger than that of
natives. Almost one in ﬁve migrants has no such degree, while it is only about one
in ten natives with no degree. On the other hand, the fraction of natives with a
vocational degree obtained through the apprenticeship system is signiﬁcantly larger
when compared to second generation migrants. These two differences with respect
to the educational and vocational attainment are most likely related. It appears that
completing Hauptschule often does not provide the necessary prerequisites to obtain
an apprenticeship position or, more generally, to enter vocational education.13
These differences in the human capital endowment between natives and second
generation migrants are, however, not reﬂected in characteristics of the previous
employment position. Prior to entering unemployment both groups were earning
11The German citizenship law was reformed in 2000. Before the reform, primarily the principle of
descent (ius sanguis) and naturalization after at least 15 years of residence were the possibilities of
obtaining German citizenship. After the reform also the law of soil (ius soli) is available to immigrant
children born in Germany, and years of residence required to apply for naturalization were reduced
to eight (with exceptions, such as three years for those with a German spouse). For a more detailed
description and analysis of the naturalization process in Germany, see Zimmermann et al. (2009).
12We assign the origin of second generation migrants through their country of citizenship (if they
do not have German citizenship) or through their parents’ country of birth. If both parents were born
abroad but in different countries, we take the father’s country of birth (Card et al., 1998; Jonsson,
2007). Guest worker countries include Turkey, former Yugoslavia, Italy, Spain and Greece. Central
and Eastern European countries include Poland, the former USSR, the former CSSR and Romania.
13See e.g. Worbs (2003) for more details. She also stresses the importance of the increasing short-
age of apprenticeship positions, which particularly affects second generation migrants.
9similar hourly wages. Also the duration of previous employment differs, on average,
by only about one month between the two groups.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics I (Selected Variables)
Natives 2nd gen. t-test
Sociodemographic characteristics
Age (in years) 35.407 32.500 4.311 ***
(10.524) (9.974)
Male 0.522 0.500 0.697
(0.500) (0.501)
German citizenship 1.000 0.759 28.741 ***
(0.000) (0.428)
East Germany 0.323 0.150 5.839 ***
(0.468) (0.358)
Married 0.420 0.372 1.498
(0.494) (0.484)
Educational attainment
No formal degree 0.010 0.015 -0.775
(0.099) (0.122)
Secondary school (9 yrs.) 0.295 0.368 -2.496 **
(Hauptschule) (0.456) (0.483)
Secondary school (10 yrs.) 0.423 0.331 2.915 ***
(Realschule) (0.494) (0.471)
Technical college entrance qualiﬁcation (11-12 yrs.) 0.049 0.056 -0.495
(Fachabitur, Fachhochschulreife) (0.217) (0.231)
General qualiﬁcation for university entrance (12-13 yrs.) 0.223 0.229 -0.247
(Abitur, Allgemeine Hochschulreife) (0.416) (0.421)
Vocational attainment
No formal degree 0.093 0.177 -4.350 ***
(0.290) (0.382)
Apprenticeship (dual system) 0.614 0.545 2.207 **
(0.487) (0.499)
Specialized vocational school 0.143 0.113 1.335
(0.350) (0.317)
University, technical college 0.150 0.165 -0.657
(0.357) (0.372)
Previous employment
Net hourly wage (in euros) 6.661 6.913 -0.893
(4.389) (4.378)
Duration (in months) 42.517 40.940 0.362
(68.194) (62.746)
# Observations 2,609 266
Source: IZA Evaluation Dataset, own calculations.
Note: Sample of individuals who were born in Germany. Second generation migrants either do not have German citizen-
ship or at least one of their parents is not German-born. Standard deviations in parentheses.
Mean difference: *** signiﬁcant at 1%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; * signiﬁcant at 10%.
104 Are Natives and Second Generation Migrants Alike?
Unemployed natives differ from unemployed second generation migrants mainly
with regard to their average age, place of residence, and human capital endowment.
These differences can be relevant when designing appropriate policies and measures
that aim to provide a quick return into employment. Besides these characteristics,
there are also a number of preferences and attitudes which appear to be relevant
in this context. Unemployed natives and unemployed second generation migrants
might very well differ in this respect.
We thus analyze four economic preferences and attitudes which are available in
our data. They are obtained from the IZA Evaluation Dataset and based on the fol-
lowing questions (translated from German):14
• Risk attitudes: How do you estimate yourself personally: are you generally pre-
pared to take risks or do you try to avoid risks?
• Time preferences: How do you regard yourself as an individual: are you someone
who generally gets impatient or someone who always has a lot of patience?
• Trust: How do you regard yourself as an individual: are you someone who gener-
ally trusts others or are you someone who does not trust others?
• Reciprocity: To what extent does the following statement apply to you? I am pre-
pared to accept costs to help someone who has helped me previously.
Responses to the questions on risk attitudes, time preferences and trust are mea-
sured on an 11 point scale, which ranges in each case from 0 to 10. An answer
of 0 indicates complete unwillingness to take risks, complete impatience, and com-
plete unwillingness to trust others, respectively. An answer of 10 indicates complete
willingness to take risks, complete patience, and complete willingness to trust oth-
ers, respectively. The wording of the questions in the IZA Evaluation Dataset is very
similar to questions in other large and representative surveys (e.g. European Social
Survey, ESS, or German Socio-Economic Panel, GSOEP), and at least some of the
questions have been experimentally validated.15 In the following, we use three al-
ternative measures for each of the three characteristics: a) actual responses on the
11 point scale (“raw index”), b) a binary indicator for a value of 6 or higher on
the 11 point scale (“binary indicator”), and c) a classiﬁcation into three categories,
where values of 3 and lower compose the lowest category, values of 4, 5 and 6 the in-
termediate category, and values of 7 and higher the highest category on the 11 point
scale (“three categories”).16
14The interviews were generally conducted in German, but depending on the language skills of the
interviewee also in Turkish and Russian.
15The question about time preferences is the same as in the GSOEP. See e.g. Dohmen et al. (2005)
for an experimental validation of a similar risk measure included in the GSOEP.
16See e.g. Jaeger et al. (2010), who also use this binary indicator for risk attitudes based on the
same 11 point scale. Robustness checks can be found in Dohmen et al. (2005).
11The response to the question regarding reciprocity is measured on a 7 point scale,
ranging from 1 to 7. An answer of 1 indicates that the statement does not apply at
all, and 7 means that the statement applies perfectly. Importantly, the question
only addresses positive reciprocity, i.e. whether someone reacts in response to nice
behavior with nice actions. Also note that the statement explicitly addresses whether
the respondent would incur costs to be positive reciprocal.17 Again, we use three
alternatives measures: a) actual responses on the 7 point scale (“raw index”), b) a
binary indicator for a value of 5 or higher on the 7 point scale (“binary indicator”),
and c) a classiﬁcation into three categories, where values of 3 and lower compose
the lowest category, values of 4 and 5 the intermediate category, and values of 6
and 7 the highest category on the 7 point scale (“three categories”).
Figure 1 illustrates the distributions of the four preferences and attitudes in our
sample. Each characteristic is measured by the raw index. We juxtapose the re-
spective distribution among natives to that among second generation migrants. The
distributions of risk attitudes look fairly similar, at least at ﬁrst glance. In both
groups, about one in four responses takes the value of 5, indicating an intermediate
willingness to take risks. Extreme values at both ends of the distribution are rarely
picked by the respondents, i.e. in both distributions the values 0 and 1 as well as
9 and 10 have very little mass. However, it appears to be the case that there is more
mass at higher values of the distribution of risk attitudes among second generation
migrants. In particular, the value of 8 is picked more frequently.
When comparing the distributions of time preferences, they appear similar for
values lower than 5. In both groups, the value of 2 is chosen the least. Natives have
a peak at 5 and 8, whereas the migrants’ responses are more smoothly distributed in
the higher segments. The values 5, 7 and 8 are rather frequently selected. The distri-
butions for trust look relatively similar to the distributions of time preferences. Na-
tives have a peak at the value of 5. This is also the value that the second generation
migrants pick most frequently, but not as often as natives. Similar to risk attitudes,
extreme values such as 1 and 2 rarely belong to the responses of the two groups. In
contrast to the ﬁrst preferences and attitudes, positive reciprocity is measured on a
7 point scale. Both distributions have more mass at higher values. However, second
generation migrants respond more frequently with the highest value of 7 and less
frequently with the lowest three values, compared to native Germans.
Table 2 summarizes information about all three measures of the four preferences
and attitudes. It displays the means for the raw index, the binary indicator and
the three categories (in each case separately for natives and second generation mi-
grants). Starting with risk attitudes, the raw index and the low risk category indicate
that natives are signiﬁcantly more risk averse than second generation migrants. The
binary indicator also points to this result. However, the difference is not signiﬁcant.
This result seems somewhat surprising, taking into account that second generation
17The statement is very similar to statement (6) in Dohmen et al. (2009), which is from the GSOEP.
12Figure 1: Preferences and Attitudes of Natives and Second Generation Migrants
Source: IZA Evaluation Dataset, own calculations.
Note: Sample of individuals who were born in Germany. Second generation migrants either do not have German citizen-
ship or at least one of their parents is not German-born. Risk attitudes, time preferences and trust are measured on an
11 point scale (from 0 to 10); reciprocity is measured on a 7 point scale (from 1 to 7).
migrants are relatively less educated than natives. Therefore, it is at odds with the
hypothesis that higher educated individuals are more willing to take risks.
With respect to time preferences, there is a signiﬁcant difference between na-
tives and second generation migrants in the lowest of the three categories. In the
latter group, a signiﬁcantly larger fraction is relatively impatient. This ﬁnding is also
reﬂected in most other numbers, although those differences are not signiﬁcant. The
numbers for trust display no signiﬁcant differences between the distributions of the
two groups. None of the two groups shows a distinct tendency regarding their level
of trust when compared to the other group. Finally, the three measures for positive
reciprocity show clear differences between natives and second generation migrants.
They indicate that second generation migrants have a signiﬁcantly larger extent of
positive reciprocity than natives. When differentiating among the three categories of
positive reciprocity, there is a signiﬁcant difference in the category indicating a low
amount of positive reciprocity. A signiﬁcantly larger share of natives has a relatively
low amount of positive reciprocity when compared to second generation migrants in
our sample.
13Table 2: Descriptive Statistics II (Economic Preferences and Attitudes)
Natives 2nd gen. t-test
Risk attitudes
Raw index 5.238 (2.304) 5.579 (2.322) -2.295 **
Binary indicator 0.439 (0.496) 0.485 (0.501) -1.430
Three categories:
Low risk 0.226 (0.418) 0.177 (0.382) 1.837 *
Intermediate risk 0.458 (0.498) 0.462 (0.500) -0.125
High risk 0.316 (0.465) 0.361 (0.481) -1.501
Time preferences
Raw index 6.117 (2.426) 5.929 (2.616) 1.195
Binary indicator 0.564 (0.496) 0.564 (0.497) -0.003
Three categories:
Impatient 0.138 (0.345) 0.177 (0.382) -1.744 *
Intermediate time preferences 0.389 (0.488) 0.357 (0.480) 1.018
Patient 0.473 (0.499) 0.466 (0.500) 0.224
Trust
Raw index 5.746 (2.106) 5.669 (2.259) 0.562
Binary indicator 0.518 (0.500) 0.519 (0.501) -0.018
Three categories:
Low trust 0.134 (0.340) 0.162 (0.369) -1.263
Intermediate trust 0.465 (0.499) 0.429 (0.496) 1.145
High trust 0.401 (0.490) 0.410 (0.493) -0.281
Positive reciprocity
Raw index 5.452 (1.651) 5.703 (1.541) -2.380 **
Binary indicator 0.769 (0.421) 0.816 (0.388) -1.728 *
Three categories:
Low positive reciprocity 0.140 (0.347) 0.083 (0.276) 2.591 ***
Intermediate positive reciprocity 0.302 (0.459) 0.316 (0.466) -0.452
High positive reciprocity 0.558 (0.497) 0.602 (0.491) -1.360
# Observations 2,609 266
Source: IZA Evaluation Dataset, own calculations.
Note: Sample of individuals who were born in Germany. Second generation migrants either do not have German citi-
zenship or at least one of their parents is not German-born. Risk attitudes, time preferences and trust are measured on
an 11 point scale (from 0 to 10); reciprocity is measured on a 7 point scale (from 1 to 7). The raw index displays those
scales; the binary indicator indicates a value of 6 or higher (11 point scale) or a value of 5 or higher (7 point scale); and
the three categories reﬂect values of 3 and lower (3 and lower) for the lowest category, values of 4, 5 and 6 (4 and 5) for
the intermediate category, and values of 7 and higher (6 and 7) for highest category on the 11 point scale (7 point scale).
Standard deviations in parentheses.
Mean difference: *** signiﬁcant at 1%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; * signiﬁcant at 10%.
145 Do Differences Make a Difference?
To analyze the differences in preferences and attitudes between natives and second
generation migrants in more detail and to assess their impact on economic outcomes,
we perform a multivariate regression analysis in which we control for differences
in other observable characteristics. The outcome variable in this analysis is being
(self-)employed at the ﬁrst interview, which took place on average two months after
unemployment entry.18
One issue deserves further attention before we continue with our analysis. Our
sample of entrants into unemployment is subject to a dynamic endogenous selection
process. This may have consequences for the economic attitudes and preferences at
the core of our interest, which may be affected by the incidence of unemployment as
well as the unemployment duration. It thus implies a potential problem of reverse
causality, as individuals may adjust preferences and attitudes, e.g. in response to un-
successful job search. However, we are conﬁdent that in our case, such effects are
small—if present at all. First, interviews were conducted very shortly after unem-
ployment entry. As we expect preferences and attitudes to be stable, at least in the
short-run, we do not expect substantial adjustments in this regard over a period of
two months. Second, all individuals were interviewed at a similar point in time rel-
ative to unemployment entry. Hence, any potential adjustments should be similarly
present for all individuals in our data.19
Table 3 summarizes the status at the ﬁrst interview for natives and second gener-
ation migrants in our sample. Our subsequent outcome variable differs signiﬁcantly
between the two groups. A larger proportion of natives than second generation
migrants had already found employment when the ﬁrst interview took place. No
signiﬁcant difference is found for subsidized (self-)employment. Second generation
migrants are signiﬁcantly more likely to be unemployed. Furthermore, a signiﬁcantly
larger share of second generation migrants is enrolled in education. This might be
related to the fact that they are, on average, younger than natives. Similar shares of
individuals in both groups either participated in active labor market policy (ALMP),
were in an apprenticeship, or were inactive when the ﬁrst interview took place.
18When we use an indicator for regular employment at the ﬁrst interview as dependent variable
(i.e. not additionally including self-employment), results remain virtually the same.
19Caliendo et al. (2010) argue along similar lines when they discuss the issue of potential reverse
causality with respect to social networks of the unemployed.
15Table 3: Descriptive Statistics III (Status at the First Interview)
Natives 2nd gen. t-test
Unsubsidized (self-)employment 0.237 0.154 3.075***
(0.426) (0.362)
Subsidized (self-)employment 0.038 0.041 –0.244
(0.192) (0.200)
Unemployment 0.655 0.737 –2.679***
(0.475) (0.441)
ALMP 0.040 0.034 0.482
(0.196) (0.181)
Education 0.002 0.008 –1.767*
(0.048) (0.087)
Apprenticeship 0.016 0.015 0.1313
(0.126) (0.122)
Inactive 0.011 0.011 –0.024
(0.105) (0.106)
# Observations 2,609 266
Source: IZA Evaluation Dataset, own calculations.
Note: Sample of individuals who were born in Germany. Second generation migrants either do not have German citizen-
ship or at least one of their parents is not German-born. Standard deviations in parentheses.
Mean difference: *** signiﬁcant at 1%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; * signiﬁcant at 10%.
Table 4 presents the results of our baseline probit regression, where the depen-
dent variable indicates whether the individual is employed at the ﬁrst interview. The
ﬁrst column reports estimates without including preferences and attitudes; in the
second column they are included. Male individuals are signiﬁcantly more likely to
be employed at the ﬁrst interview in both regressions. The coefﬁcients on age, mari-
tal status and schooling have the expected signs, but are in general not signiﬁcantly
different from zero. In contrast, the variables indicating different categories of vo-
cational attainment have a strong and signiﬁcant impact on the probability of being
employed at the ﬁrst interview. Interestingly and somewhat surprisingly, individuals
who have completed an apprenticeship or graduated from a specialized vocational
school have an even higher probability of being employed than university graduates.
It should, however, be kept in mind that only two months since unemployment entry
have passed. This picture might change over time.
The duration of last employment also plays a large role in explaining reemploy-
ment patterns in our data. Respondents with a former job duration of less than ﬁve
years have a higher employment probability than individuals with more than ﬁve
years. A potential explanation might be that individuals who have been previously
employed for relatively shorter durations are more ﬂexible and thus faster in ﬁnding
new jobs, which might also be related to lower expectations for future employment.
The amount of unemployment beneﬁts and the probability of being employed at the
16ﬁrst interview show a signiﬁcantly negative relationship: the higher the amount of
unemployment beneﬁts, the lower is the probability of employment. This is con-
sistent with theory and previous empirical ﬁndings (see e.g. Cahuc and Zylberberg,
2004, Chapter 3, and references therein). The presence and number of children does
not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the outcome variable in our regression.
Second generation migrants have on average—even after controlling for the
characteristics mentioned before—a signiﬁcantly lower employment probability at
the ﬁrst interview. This difference, however, slightly decreases when we additionally
control for preferences and attitudes in the second column of Table 4. When we
test the equality of the coefﬁcient estimates, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of
equality. Although the effect on the native-migrant difference appears to be moder-
ate, a likelihood ratio test indicates a better model ﬁt of the regression in the second
column.
In this regression, risk attitudes have a signiﬁcantly negative inﬂuence on the
employment probability. The more risk loving an individual is, other things equal,
the less likely he or she is employed shortly after unemployment entry. This ﬁnding
is consistent with theory and previous empirical ﬁndings. Pannenberg (2010) shows
that a higher willingness to take risks is associated with a higher reservation wage,
and thus with a lower employment probability.
To test whether economic preferences and attitudes have a differential impact on
second generation migrants and natives, we estimate an additional model speciﬁca-
tion that includes interaction effects of the dummy variable for second generation
migrants, with the four measures of economic preferences and attitudes. The coef-
ﬁcient estimates on the interaction terms are not signiﬁcantly different from zero.
Hence, we do not ﬁnd support for a differential impact across the two groups. Simi-
larly, we do not ﬁnd large differences across gender. When estimating the regressions
separately for men and women, we ﬁnd, in general, no substantial differences com-
pared to the results reported in Table 4. The only difference is a signiﬁcantly positive
inﬂuence of trust in the female regression, which is not the case for men.










No school degree reference reference
(reference) (reference)
School 9 yrs 0.013 0.016
(0.074) (0.073)
School 10 yrs 0.003 0.006
(0.074) (0.073)
School 11-12 yrs 0.034 0.035
(0.079) (0.079)
School 12-13 yrs 0.017 0.018
(0.075) (0.075)




Spec. vocational school 0.093 0.093
(0.033)∗∗∗ (0.033)∗∗∗
University, techn. college 0.075 0.075
(0.034)∗∗ (0.034)∗∗
No prior job reference reference
(reference) (reference)
Duration last job <=1 year 0.153 0.154
(0.031)∗∗∗ (0.031)∗∗∗
Duration last job <=5 yrs. 0.149 0.149
(0.032)∗∗∗ (0.032)∗∗∗
Duration last job <=10 yrs. 0.07 0.07
(0.039)∗ (0.039)∗
Duration last job >10 yrs. 0.08 0.077
(0.04)∗∗ (0.04)∗
Logarithm of unemployment beneﬁts -.040 -.040
(0.002)∗∗∗ (0.002)∗∗∗
Children in household 0.011 0.011
(0.033) (0.033)
Number of children in household -.011 -.010
(0.018) (0.018)











# Observations 2,875 2,875
Source: IZA Evaluation Dataset, own calculations.
Note: Probit regressions. Average marginal effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable:
(self-)employed at ﬁrst interview. Preferences and attitudes are included by the raw index in model (2). Additional
control variables are dummies for German federal states, month of entry into unemployment and time between unem-
ployment entry and interview (7-14 weeks).
*** signiﬁcant at 1%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; * signiﬁcant at 10%.
18Table 5: Probit Regressions II (Risk Attitudes: Employed at the First Interview)
Baseline (1) (2) (3)
Risk: raw index (0, 1, 2, ..., 10) -.008
(0.003)∗∗
Risk: binary indicator (1 if ≥6) -.041
(0.015)∗∗∗
Risk: low (1 if ≤3) 0.014
(0.018)
Risk: intermediate (1 if 4–6) reference
(reference)
Risk: high (1 if ≥7) -.034
(0.017)∗∗
Second generation migrant -.070 -.067 -.067 -.067
(0.027)∗∗ (0.027)∗∗ (0.027)∗∗ (0.027)∗∗
Log-Likelihood –1309.1311 –1306.2475 –1305.236 –1305.8124
# Observations 2,875 2,875 2,875 2,875
Source: IZA Evaluation Dataset, own calculations.
Note: Probit regressions. Average marginal effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable:
(self-)employed at ﬁrst interview. Additional control variables are male, age and age squared, married, educational
and vocational variables, dummies of duration of last employment, logarithm of unemployment beneﬁts, children in
household, dummies for German federal states, month of entry into unemployment and time between unemployment
entry and interview (7-14 weeks). Full estimation results are available upon request.
*** signiﬁcant at 1%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; * signiﬁcant at 10%.
Table 5 reveals the results of the baseline regression when we include the three
different measures of risk attitudes in three separate regressions. The ﬁrst column
shows the results of the baseline regression (without controlling for preferences and
attitudes) and is added to facilitate comparison. The coefﬁcients of the raw index
and the binary indicator are both negative and signiﬁcant, and the coefﬁcient es-
timate on the second generation dummy decreases slightly. When we include the
low and high risk categories and take the intermediate category as reference, we
ﬁnd that it is individuals with a particularly high willingness to take risks who drive
the overall effect. Furthermore, the coefﬁcient estimate on the indicator for second
generation migrants also decreases, albeit slightly in this regression.
To shed more light on the underlying mechanism behind these ﬁndings, we in-
vestigate the relationship between risk attitudes, reservation wages and search in-
tensity in more detail.20 First, we ﬁnd support for the hypothesis that more risk
averse individuals are less selective, i.e. that they have lower reservation wages—
which then lead to higher employment probabilities. This is true for both native
job seekers and unemployed second generation migrants.21 Thus we cannot reject
the hypothesis that higher reservation wages is the mechanism through which a sig-
20See Tables A1, A2 and A3 in the Appendix. The number of observations decreases in this exercise
because reservation wages, the number of search channels used, and the number of applications sent
out are only elicited for those individuals who are actively searching for employment at the time of
the ﬁrst interview. Individuals who had already found employment are not included.
21It appears that second generation migrants generally have higher reservation wages than natives,
also conditional on risk attitudes. This ﬁnding certainly deserves further research.
19niﬁcantly lower employment probability for individuals with a high willingness to
take risks results. Second, we ﬁnd that the number of search channels used—as an
approximation of search intensity—is virtually the same for both natives and sec-
ond generations migrants in our sample. Moreover, the number of search channels
decreases very slightly in the willingness to take risks. However, a second approx-
imation of search intensity, the number of applications sent out by the individuals,
indicates that search intensity increases in the willingness to take risks.22 This lat-
ter ﬁnding is in line with the observation of lower reservation wages for more risk
averse individuals. Search intensity may thus be a channel through which the direct
effect of risk attitudes on reservation wages is reinforced.
Furthermore, we investigate in more detail the inﬂuence of time preferences,
trust and positive reciprocity on the probability of being employed at the ﬁrst in-
terview. In those additional regressions, we individually include the three different
measures for each of the preferences and attitudes.23 Interestingly, and indepen-
dently of the measure used, none of the three characteristics exhibits signiﬁcant
explanatory power in these regressions. The coefﬁcient estimates on the indicator
for second generation migrants remain virtually the same in all regressions. It thus
appears that among the preferences and attitudes we examine, only the measures of
risk attitudes enter statistically signiﬁcantly in the regressions. That is, risk attitudes
explain the probability of being employed at the ﬁrst interview. Despite descriptive
differences between natives and migrants, which are to some extent present in the
case of the three other preferences and attitudes, these do not appear to signiﬁ-
cantly inﬂuence the employment probability—at least not beyond those characteris-
tics which are also controlled for in our regressions.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we study four types of preferences and attitudes that individuals who
enter into unemployment in Germany exhibit; namely, a) risk attitudes, b) time
preferences, c) trust and d) positive reciprocity. We further distinguish between
natives and second generation migrants to analyze whether there are differences
between these two groups in this regard, and whether such differences matter in
terms of subsequent employment prospects.
Our results indicate that there are differences between natives and second gen-
eration migrants with respect to preferences and attitudes, and these differences
mainly lie in attitudes towards risk and in positive reciprocity. Second generation
migrants show a signiﬁcantly higher willingness to take risks, and they are less likely
to have a low amount of positive reciprocity when compared to natives. Those dif-
22Second generation migrants with intermediate risk attitudes have, on average, the lowest number
of applications sent out. We cannot explain this ﬁnding, but it is rather striking.
23See Tables A4, A5 and A6 in the Appendix.
20ferences also matter in terms of economic outcomes, and more speciﬁcally in terms
of employability two months after unemployment entry. We observe a signiﬁcantly
lower employment probability for individuals with a high willingness to take risks,
even when controlling for other observable characteristics. The mechanism through
which this occurs is very likely the reservation wage, which is found to be higher
for individuals with a lower degree of risk aversion. Search intensity may be an-
other channel through which the direct effect of risk attitudes on reservation wages
is reinforced. Therefore, our ﬁndings offer interesting perspectives, e.g. with regard
to the design and targeting of active labor market policy. It may be reasonable to
speciﬁcally focus on less risk averse individuals with measures such as job search
requirements and monitoring, which potentially lower the expectations and reserva-
tion wages of those unemployed individuals.
However, our ﬁndings are not the answer to the question why second genera-
tion migrants still lag behind natives in numerous economic outcomes. Including
preferences and attitudes in our regressions only moderately shrinks the natives
and second generation migrants disparity in terms of their employment probabil-
ity two months after they enter unemployment. It may be worth investigating the
long-term effects of these non-cognitive characteristics on reemployment probabili-
ties, although the issue of reverse causality becomes more of a concern in this case.
Moreover, our data do not include ﬁrst generation migrants. Nonetheless, an inter-
esting avenue for future research would be to include those individuals, e.g. to study
the potential patterns of adaptation over the migrant generations in the job search
process—and beyond.
It should also be kept in mind that our data are not representative of the entire
population of second generation migrants and natives in Germany. The IZA Eval-
uation Dataset is comprised of a representative inﬂow sample into unemployment.
There are, however, underlying dynamics of the process of becoming unemployed,
which, while they go beyond the scope of this paper, may cause the distribution of
preferences and attitudes to be different in our sample from that in the population.
For instance, it has been shown that public sector employees are more risk averse
than employees in the private sector (Buurman et al., 2009). Assuming that pub-
lic sector employees are less likely to become unemployed and less likely to have a
migration background, this is one channel through which an inﬂow sample into un-
employment would not be representative of the population in terms of preferences
and attitudes. This may well be an important explanation to why our ﬁndings are,
in some aspects, in contrast to previous ﬁndings in the literature on preferences and
attitudes of migrants and natives.
When considering the broader picture and the context of our paper, the slow
reintegration of second generation migrants into the labor market may also be re-
lated to other characteristics than preferences and attitudes. For instance, we know
that there are substantial differences in human capital. Furthermore, migrants might
have different access to social networks that are important in the job search process,
21especially in informal job search. Beyond access to such networks, the size and qual-
ity of migrants’ networks may also be very different from natives’ networks. Second
generation migrants may very likely be affected by racial or ethnic discrimination.
Lastly, ethnic identity is also an important factor inﬂuencing an array of economic
outcomes through various channels. The extent to which those potential explana-
tions apply, and how they potentially interact, deserves further research.
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Total 7.17 7.10 7.69
Low Risk (≤3) 6.74 6.69 7.23
Intermediate Risk (4–6) 7.09 7.03 7.62
High Risk (≥7) 7.56 7.50 8.02
# Observations 1,715 1,533 182
Source: IZA Evaluation Dataset, own calculations.
Note: Net hourly reservation wage (in A C). Risk is measured on an 11 point scale (from 0 to 10).





Total 4.83 4.83 4.80
Low Risk (≤3) 4.91 4.91 4.91
Intermediate Risk (4–6) 4.81 4.82 4.72
High Risk (≥7) 4.80 4.79 4.84
# Observations 2,407 2,178 229
Source: IZA Evaluation Dataset, own calculations.
Note: Average number of search channels used. Risk is measured on an 11 point scale (from 0 to 10).





Total 15.81 15.85 15.40
Low Risk (≤3) 14.40 14.31 15.38
Intermediate Risk (4–6) 15.14 15.40 12.63
High Risk (≥7) 17.81 17.65 19.14
# Observations 2,396 2,171 225
Source: IZA Evaluation Dataset, own calculations.
Note: Average number of applications sent out. Risk is measured on an 11 point scale (from 0 to 10).
25Table A4: Probit Regressions III (Time Preferences: Employed at the First Interview)
Baseline (1) (2) (3)
Time: raw index (0, 1, 2, ..., 10) 0.004
(0.003)
Time: binary indicator (1 if ≥6) 0.018
(0.015)
Time: impatient (1 if ≤3) -.027
(0.023)
Time: intermediate (1 if 4–6) reference
(reference)
Time: patient (1 if ≥7) -.002
(0.016)
Second generation migrant -.070 -.069 -.070 -.069
(0.027)∗∗ (0.027)∗∗ (0.027)∗∗∗ (0.027)∗∗
Log-Likelihood –1309.1311 –1308.0035 –1308.3675 –1308.4089
# Observations 2,875 2,875 2,875 2,875
Source: IZA Evaluation Dataset, own calculations.
Note: Probit regressions. Average marginal effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable:
(self-)employed at ﬁrst interview. Additional control variables are male, age and age squared, married, educational
and vocational variables, dummies of duration of last employment, logarithm of unemployment beneﬁts, children in
household, dummies for German federal states, month of entry into unemployment and time between unemployment
entry and interview (7-14 weeks). Full estimation results are available on request.
*** signiﬁcant at 1%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; * signiﬁcant at 10%.
Table A5: Probit Regressions IV (Trust: Employed at the First Interview)
Baseline (1) (2) (3)
Trust: raw index (0, 1, 2, ..., 10) 0.003
(0.003)
Trust: binary indicator (1 if ≥6) 0.021
(0.015)
Trust: low (1 if ≤3) -.004
(0.023)
Trust: intermediate (1 if 4–6) reference
(reference)
Trust: high (1 if ≥7) 0.0004
(0.016)
Second generation migrant -.070 -.070 -.070 -.070
(0.027)∗∗ (0.027)∗∗ (0.027)∗∗ (0.027)∗∗
Log-Likelihood –1309.1311 –1308.8179 –1308.1268 –1309.1139
# Observations 2,875 2,875 2,875 2,875
Source: IZA Evaluation Dataset, own calculations.
Note: Probit regressions. Average marginal effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable:
(self-)employed at ﬁrst interview. Additional control variables are male, age and age squared, married, educational
and vocational variables, dummies of duration of last employment, logarithm of unemployment beneﬁts, children in
household, dummies for German federal states, month of entry into unemployment and time between unemployment
entry and interview (7-14 weeks). Full estimation results are available on request.
*** signiﬁcant at 1%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; * signiﬁcant at 10%.
26Table A6: Probit Regressions V (Pos. Reciprocity: Employed at the First Interview)
Baseline (1) (2) (3)
Reciprocity: raw index (1, 2, ..., 7) 0.003
(0.004)
Reciprocity: binary indicator (1 if ≥5) 0.014
(0.015)
Reciprocity: low (1 if ≤3) -.007
(0.024)
Reciprocity: intermediate (1 if 4–5) reference
(reference)
Reciprocity: high (1 if ≥6) 0.012
(0.016)
Second generation migrant -.070 -.071 -.070 -.071
(0.027)∗∗ (0.027)∗∗∗ (0.027)∗∗∗ (0.027)∗∗∗
Log-Likelihood -1309.131 -1308.961 -1308.691 -1308.653
# Observations 2,875 2,875 2,875 2,875
Source: IZA Evaluation Dataset, own calculations.
Note: Probit regressions. Average marginal effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable:
(self-)employed at ﬁrst interview. Additional control variables are male, age and age squared, married, educational
and vocational variables, dummies of duration of last employment, logarithm of unemployment beneﬁts, children in
household, dummies for German federal states, month of entry into unemployment and time between unemployment
entry and interview (7-14 weeks). Full estimation results are available on request.
*** signiﬁcant at 1%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; * signiﬁcant at 10%.
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